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This paper shows the contributions that nominal interest payments, the maturity composition of
the debt, in°ation, and growth in real GDP have made to the evolution of the U.S. debt to GDP
ratio since World War II. Among the questions we answer are these. Did the U.S. in°ate away
much of the debt by using in°ation to pay negative real rates of return? Sometimes, but not
usually. Did high net-of-interest de¯cits send the debt-GDP ratio upward? Substantially during
World War II, but not too much after that. How much did growth in GDP help contribute to
holding down the debt GDP ratio? A lot. How much did the variation in returns across maturities
a®ect the evolution at the debt to GDP ratio? At times substantially, but on average not much
since the end of World War II.
Our answers to these questions rely on our own accounting scheme and not the U.S. gov-
ernment's.1 Our accounting emerges from a decomposition of the government's period-by-period
budget constraint, to be described in section 2 and justi¯ed in detail in appendix A. We use
prices of indexed and nominal debt of each maturity to construct one-period holding period yields
on government IOU's of various maturities. Multiplying the vector of returns by the vector of
quantities outstanding each period then gives us the appropriate concept of interest payments
that appears in the government budget constraint.
Unfortunately, the government's interest payments series fails to measure the concept that
appears in the government budget constraint, the equation that determines the evolution of the
debt to GDP ratio. Appendix B describes how the government's measure ignores capital gains and
losses on longer term government obligations, an error that is revealed by the absence of holding
period yields for longer maturity government obligations in what we think is the government's
formula for interest payments. The government creates its estimate of interest by summing all
coupon payments and adding to that sum a one-period holding period yield times all principal
repayments. The government could drive that measure of interest payments to zero every period
by perpetually rolling over, let us say, zero-coupon 10 year bonds. Such bonds would never pay
coupons and never mature: each period they would be repurchased as nine year zero-coupon
bonds and reissued as fresh 10 year zero-coupon bonds. Though the government accounts would
put interest payments at zero, the government would still pay interest in the economically relevant
sense determined by the government budget constraint.
2 Interest payments in the government budget constraint
Let Yt be real GDP at t and let Bt be the real value of government IOU's owed the public. That
least controversial equation of macroeconomics, the government budget constraint, accounts for
how a nominal interest rate ~ rt¡1;t, net in°ation ¼t¡1;t, net growth in real GDP gt¡1;t, and the
net-of-interest de¯cit deft combine to determine the evolution of the government debt-GDP ratio:
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1Meaning the Treasury and the NIPA.
2The appropriate concept of a nominal return ~ rt¡1;t is one that veri¯es this equation.2
The nominal yield ~ rt¡1;t and the real stock of debt Bt in equation (1) are averages of pertinent
objects across terms to maturity. To bring out some of the consequences of interest rate risk and
the maturity structure of the debt for the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio, we re¯ne equation (1)
to recognize that the government pays di®erent nominal one-period holding period returns on
the IOUs of di®erent maturities that compose Bt. Thus, let B
j
t¡1 and ¹ B
j
t¡1 be the real values









t¡1 are the total real values of nominal and indexed debt at t¡1; let ~ r
j
t¡1;t be the
net nominal holding period yield between t ¡ 1 and t on nominal zero-coupon bonds of maturity
j; let ¹ r
j
t¡1;t be the net real holding period yield between t ¡ 1 and t on in°ation indexed zero
coupon bonds of maturity j.3 Then the government budget constraint expresses the following law
of motion for the debt-GDP ratio:
































Bt¡1 + ¹ Bt¡1
Yt¡1
: (2)
Notice how equation (2) distinguishes contributions to the growth of the debt-GDP ratio that
depend on debt maturity j from those that don't. Thus, ¼t¡1;t and gt¡1;t don't depend on j and
operate on the total real value of debt last period; but the holding period yields ~ r
j
t¡1;t and ¹ r
j
t¡1;t






Section 3 describes the behavior of holding period yields across maturities. Section 4 then
displays the outcome of our accounting exercise by decomposing the evolution of the ratio of
debt to GDP into components coming from in°ation, growth in real GDP, nominal yields, and
the maturity composition of the debt. Appendix A describes the data and the theory of the
term structure of interest rates that we use to construct components of the government budget
constraint (2). Appendix B compares our estimates of interest payments on the U.S. government
debt to quite di®erent estimates reported by the Federal government. Appendix B also reverse
2The nominal value of interest payments from the government to the public is
~ rt¡1;tpt¡1Bt¡1
Yt¡1 where pt¡1 is the
price level at t ¡ 1. Unfortunately, the U.S. government reports something that it calls `interest payments' as a
component of Federal expenditures, but this is not the same as the term
~ rt¡1;tpt¡1Bt¡1
Yt¡1 that belongs in (1). As we
discuss in appendix B, what the government reports presumably was designed to answer some question, but that
question is not \what is the appropriate interest payment to record in order to account properly for the motion
through time of the real government debt owed to the public?"
3In a nonstochastic version of the standard growth model that is widely used in macroeconomics and public
¯nance, the net holding period yield on debt is identical for zero-coupon bonds of all maturities (e.g., see Ljungqvist
and Sargent, 2011, chapter 11). The presence of risk and possibly incomplete markets changes that.
3engineers the question that the o±cial government interest series seemingly answers, though we
confess limited success in making sense of that question. To help bring out the quantitative
signi¯cance of the interest rate risk that confronts the government and its creditors, appendix
C constructs counterfactual series for the evolution of the debt/GDP series under alternative
hypothetical debt-management policies the choice among which would have no impact on the
evolution of the debt-GDP ratio in a world without interest rate risk.
3 Risk and return across maturities
To set the stage for the role that interest rate risks will play in our story, for various maturities
j measured in years, ¯gure 1 shows contributions to the propulsion of B=Y in formula (1) from






Yt¡1 . The ¯gure shows that volatility of nominal interest rate
payments has been larger for longer horizons. For the period 1942-2008, ¯gure 2 plots average
one-year real holding period while ¯gure 3 plots the standard deviation of the one-year real holding
by maturity.4;5 Figure 2 reveals that while longer maturities have generally been associated with
higher and more volatile returns, returns on bonds maturing in 15, 20 and 30 years were on
average lower than those for adjacent maturities. This outcome re°ects investors' preferences for
newly issued or so-called `on the run' securities.
Figure 4 plots the average maturity, in years, of the Treasury debt held by the public. Imme-
diately after World War II, the average maturity of the government portfolio was approximately 7
years. Over the next three decades, it fell steadily, reaching a trough in the mid-1970s at around
2 years. In the 1960s and early 1970s this fall is partly the consequence of federal legislation,
repealed in 1975, which prevented the Treasury from issuing long-term instruments paying inter-
est above a threshold rate, that market rates exceeded during that period. As we shall see, by
causing the Treasury to shorten the average maturity of its debt during the high in°ation years
of the 1970s, this law prevented the government from fully bene¯ting from the negative implicit
real interest it managed to pay through in°ation. Since the repeal of this restriction, the Treasury
has lengthened the maturity the average maturity to between 3 and 4 years.
4 Contributions to the evolution of the U.S. debt-GDP ratio
Figure 5 reports the ratio of the market value of U.S. Treasury debt to GDP from 1941 to 2008.6
In 1941, this ratio was 29.6 and in 1945 it stood at 66.2 percent. It fell steadily over the next
4A principal aim of stochastic discount factor models like the one proposed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) is
to capture how means and standard deviations of one-period holding period yields depend on maturity.
5TIPS are not included in the holding period yields in these graphs.
6Figure 5 plots the ratio of the end of the calendar year total market value of interest-bearing marketable
Treasury securities held by private investors to GDP. This measure of government debt is narrower than other
Federal debt series sometimes reported. It does not include nonmarketable securities (e.g. savings bonds, special
issues to state and local governments), securities held by other government entities (e.g. the Federal Reserve or the
Social Security Trust Fund), or agency debt (e.g. Tennessee Valley Authority). Further each security is valued at
market prices rather than par values. See appendix A for a complete description of how this series was constructed.










































Figure 1: Decomposition of the Nominal Payouts by Maturity of Obligation













Yt¡1 ; and the line
































Figure 2: Mean Real Holding Period Returns
by Maturity





























Figure 3: Standard Deviation of the Real
Holding Period Returns by Maturity

































Figure 4: Average maturity, in years, for the Federal debt
three decades, reaching a trough in 1974 at 11.3 percent. After the de¯cits of the 1980s, it peaked
again in 1993 at 42 percent. It fell below 30 percent during the Clinton administration, but by
December 2008 it had climbed back to 37.8 percent.
What contributions did in°ation, growth, and compound interest make to the evolution of the
debt-GDP ratio depicted in ¯gure 5? To prepare the decompositions reported in table 1, we take
Bt¡¿+ ¹ Bt¡¿
Yt¡¿ as an initial condition at time t ¡ ¿ and iterate on (2) to arrive at:



































Bt¡¿ + ¹ Bt¡¿
Yt¡¿
: (3)
Figure 6 and table 1 reports elements of a decomposition based on equation (3). In particular,
for various values of t and ¿, table 1 reports decompositions of the debt-GDP increments Bt+ ¹ Bt
Yt ¡
Bt¡¿+ ¹ Bt¡¿
Yt¡¿ into components attributable to (i) the maturity structure of interest payments, (ii)
in°ation, (iii) GDP growth, and (iv) the primary de¯cit.























Figure 5: Ratio of Market Value of Public Debt Held by Private Investors to GDP





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Figure 7 shows the contributions to Bt+ ¹ Bt
Yt ¡
Bt¡1+ ¹ Bt¡1
Yt¡1 depicted on the right side of (2). The








Yt¡1 ; the top right panel shows ¡100 £ ¼t¡1;t
Bt¡1
Yt¡1 ; the
bottom left panel shows ¡100 £ gt¡1;t
Bt¡1
Yt¡1 ; and the bottom right panel shows 100 £ deft
Yt . The
nominal returns series plotted in the top left panel is the sum of the three series plotted in ¯gure
1.
Figure 8 plots the in°ation rate, the growth rate of real GDP, and the value weighted return on
the government's debt portfolio. For the ¯rst half of the sample, the growth rate of GDP exceeded
the return on the debt, while in the second half of the sample, the return on the government debt
exceeded the growth rate.
Table 1 and ¯gures 6, 7, and 8 reveal the following patterns in the way that the U.S. grew,
in°ated, and paid its way toward higher or lower B=Y ratios:
1. From 1945 to 1974, the debt to GDP ratio fell from 66.2 to 11.3. Of this 54.9 percentage
drop,
(a) 12.5 was due to negative real returns on debt via in°ation. This largely (10.3 out 12.5)
hit the long-term bond holders. The average maturity of the debt was around 7 years
right after WWII.
(b) 21.6 was due to growth in real GDP.
(c) 20.8 was due to running primary surpluses
2. During the 1970s, the U.S. continued to in°ate away part of the debt, but the magnitudes
were small.
(a) Long term bond holders received negative real returns, but since there was not much
debt outstanding (B=Y was less than :2) and the average maturity of the debt was low
(around 2 years), the government was unable to nail the long-term bond holders as it
had done immediately after WWII.
(b) B=Y continued to grow during the 1970s in spite of the government in°ating away
part of the debt. The causes were insu±ciently rapid real GDP growth and primary
de¯cits.
3. During the Reagan-Bush (41) years (1981-1992),7 the debt to GDP ratio grew from 16.6 in
1982 to 42.0 in 1993{ an increase of 25.4 percent.
(a) Almost half of this increase (11.3) came from primary de¯cits.
(b) Despite strong GDP growth, B=Y grew by more than the primary de¯cits due to
large real returns paid to bond holders. Returns to long-term bond holders account
for nearly 10.0 of the 25.4 increase. Thus, while long-term bondholders were heavily
taxed by in°ation after WWII, they did very well when Volcker brought in°ation down
during the early 1980s.
7The 41 stands for the forty-¯rst president.




















































Figure 7: Contributions to Changes in the Debt to GDP Ratio








Yt¡1 ; the top right panel shows ¡100 £ ¼t¡1;t
Bt¡1
Yt¡1 ; the
bottom left panel shows ¡100 £ gt¡1;t
Bt¡1
Yt¡1 ; and the bottom right panel shows 100 £
deft
Yt .











































Returns, In°ation, and Growth
Figure 8: Return on Government Debt, In°ation, and GDP Growth Rate
Top left panel, value weighted return on the government's debt portfolio; top right, the in°ation rate, bottom left,
the growth rate of real GDP. In the bottom right plot, the solid blue line is the growth rate in real GDP, the
red dot-dashed lined is the in°ation rate, and the black dashed line is the value-weighted nominal return on the
government's portfolio of debt.




























Figure 9: One Year Holding Period Real Valued-Weighted Returns of Nominal Debt and In°ation-
Protected Debt























4. The reduction in B=Y that occurred during the Clinton years (1993-2000) was largely driven
by primary surpluses. Real returns to bond holders approximately o®set the contribution
from GDP growth.
5. During the Bush (43) years (2001-2008),8 primary de¯cits largely fueled growth in B=Y .






















, which are the value-weighted real
one-year holding period returns on the government's portfolio of nominal and in°ation-protected
debt, respectively. These two series are quite volatile. The average annual return on the nominal
portion of the debt over the entire time period from 1942 to 2008 was 1.7 percent with a standard
deviation of 4.9 percent. Figure 9 reveals three especially striking outcomes:
1. There were large negative returns immediately after World War II.
8The 43 stands for the forty-third president.
12Variable Mean Std Dev
Nominal Return on Nominal Debt 5.47 4.53
Real Return on Nominal Debt 1.69 4.87
In°ation 3.77 2.67
Nominal GDP growth 7.09 3.77
Real GDP growth 3.28 3.43
100£ De¯cit to GDP Ratio 1.07 5.40
Real Return on TIPS (1998-2008) 4.29 7.36
Real Return on Nominal Debt (1998-2008) 3.33 3.74
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Components to Debt-to-GDP Dynamics: 1942-2008
2. There were large positive returns in the early 1980s after Volcker brought down in°ation.9
3. Annual real returns were considerably more volatile in the period between 1980 and 2006 {
a period of low volatility in GDP growth often described as the Great Moderation.
We see in table 2 that the average growth rate of the real GDP exceeds the sum the average
real return paid to the government's creditors and the average de¯cit-to-GDP ratio. Finally it is
interesting to note that since the introduction of TIPS, their returns have on average exceeded
those of the nominal debt. For the TIPS the real return for the period from 1998 to 2008 is 4.3
percent with a standard deviation 7.4. For the nominal portion of the debt over this ten-year
period, the real return was 3.3 percent with a standard deviation 3.7.
5 Conclusion
From 1946 to 1974, the United States reduced the debt to GDP ratio far below what it had
been immediately after World War II. During these three decades, the U.S. managed to reduce
its debt-to-GDP ratio by 85 percent by a mixture of negative real returns on its bonds, primary
surpluses, and rapidly growing real income. Only about 20 percent of the decline in the debt-GDP
came from using in°ation to deliver negative returns to bond-holders. The remaining 80 percent
was split about equally between growth in GDP and running net-of-interest surpluses.
The mix has changed. Since 1974, for the most part, government creditors have on average
been paid positive, though highly volatile, real returns. In particular, during the early 1980s, when,
perhaps unexpectedly, Paul Volcker brought down in°ation, government bondholders earned pos-
itive real returns that outpaced the growth in real GDP, increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio beyond
what would have been implied by the Reagan-era primary de¯cits themselves. The debt paydown
9It is interesting to compare these outcomes with predictions of Lucas and Stokey's (1983) model of tax smooth-
ing, according to which government debt pays low returns when there are high government expenditure shocks. See
Berndt, Lustig, and Yeltekin (2009) for an empirical study and also Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2008).
13of the 1990s was largely driven by years of primary surpluses with the positive real interest paid
to bondholders roughly o®setting growth in real GDP.
We get these conclusions by manipulating the government's period-by-period budget con-
straint. Directly computing real returns on government debts of various maturities lets us accu-
rately measure contributions to the evolution of the debt-to-GDP ratio. In addition, we claim to
have reverse engineered the question answered by the government's series on interest payments,
whose intertemporal properties di®er from ours substantially.
The Congressional Budget O±ce estimates that the debt-to-GDP ratio will return to World
War II levels by the end of 2011 as a consequence of recent large primary de¯cits and drops in
GDP growth.10 This has reawakened concerns that rising government interest payments could
eventually unleash in°ation or other painful ¯scal readjustments via `unpleasant monetarist arith-
metic' (Sargent and Wallace (1981)).11 A key element of that unpleasant arithmetic is the ratio
of interest payments on the government debt to government expenditures or GDP. So to frame
the tradeo®s and risks facing the United States, it is important to account appropriately for the
substantial interest rate risks that the U.S. government shares with its creditors.
10See table 1.1 on page 2 of \The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update," Congressional Budget O±ce,
August 2009.
11See for example, Edward Andrews' article in the November 22, 2009 New York Times \Payback Time: Wave
of Debt Payments Facing U.S. Government," and Martin Feldstein's op-ed in the April 19, 2009 Financial Times
\In°ation is Looming on America's Horizon."
14A Good accounting
At each date t, we compute the number of dollars the government has promised for each date
t+j in the future. We regard a coupon bond consisting of a stream of promised coupons plus an
ultimate principal payment as a bundle of zero coupon bonds of di®erent maturities. We price
it by unbundling it into a set of component zero-coupon bonds, one for each date at which a
coupon on the bond is due, valuing each such component individually, then adding up the value
of the components. In other words, we strip the coupons from the bond and price the bond as a
weighted sum of zero coupon bonds of maturities j = 1;2;:::;n. The market and the government
already do this. Prestripped coupon bonds are routinely traded.
We treat nominal bonds and in°ation-indexed bonds separately. For nominal bonds, let st
t+j
be the number of time t + j dollars that the government has promised to deliver, as of time t.
To compute st
t+j from historical data, we add up all of the dollar principal-plus-coupon payments
that the government has promised to deliver at date t+j as of date t. We let ¹ st
t+j be the number
of in°ation protected t + j dollars, or time t + j goods, that the government has promised to
deliver, as of time t.
Since zero-coupon bond prices were not directly observable until prestripped coupon bonds
were introduced in 1985, we extract the nominal implicit forward rates from government bond
price data. We then convert these nominal forward rates on government debt into prices of claims
on future dollars. Let qt





(1 + ½jt)j ¼ exp(¡j½jt)
where ½jt is the time t yield to maturity on bonds with j periods to maturity. The yield curve
at time t is a graph of yield to maturity ½jt against maturity j. The vector fqt
t+jgn
j=1, where n is
the longest maturity outstanding, prices all nominal zero coupon bonds at t. To convert t dollars




where pt is the price level in base year 2005 dollars, and vt is the value of currency measured in
goods per dollar.
For in°ation-protected bonds (TIPS), let ¹ st
t+j be the number of time t + j goods that the
government promises to deliver at time t. For indexed debt, when we add up the principal and
coupon payments that the government has promised to deliver at date t+j as of date t, we must
adjust for past realizations of in°ation in ways consistent with the rules governing TIPS.
To compute a real price of a promise, sold at time t, of goods at time t + j, ¹ ½jt, we construct
a real yield to maturity as
¹ ½jt = ½jt ¡ ¼t¡1;t
15where ¼t¡1;t is the in°ation rate from t¡1 to t realized at t. We appeal to a random walk model
for in°ation to justify this way of estimating real yields to maturities.12 We then compute ¹ qt
t+j,




(1 + ¹ ½jt)j ¼ exp(¡j¹ ½jt):












The ¯rst term is the real value of the nominal debt, computed by multiplying the number of time
t + j dollars that the government has sold, st
t+j, by their price in terms of time t dollars, qt
t+j,
summing over all outstanding bonds, j = 1;:::;n, and then converting from dollars to goods by
multiplying by vt. The second term is the value of the in°ation-protected debt, computed by
multiplying the number of time t+j goods that the government has promised, ¹ st
t+j, by their price
in terms of time t goods, ¹ qt
t+j, and then summing over j = 1;:::;n.
A.1 Constraint on debt management (or open market) policy













t+j ¡ ~ st
t+j) = 0; (4)
where f^ st
t+jgn
j=1 is an alternative portfolio of nominal claims and f~ st
t+jgn
j=1 is an alternative port-
folio of real claims. This equation expresses the restriction that the total value of government debt
is set by the government's funding requirements, which are determined by obligations stemming
from its borrowing in the past and from its current net-of-interest de¯cit.
A.2 Government budget constraint, a.k.a. the law of motion for debt
Let deft be the government's real net-of-interest budget de¯cit, measured in units of time t goods.





















t+j¡1 + deft; (5)
where it is understood that qt
t = 1 and ¹ qt
t = vt. The left hand side of equation (5) is the real
value of the interest bearing debt at the end of period t. The right side of equation (5) is the sum
of the real value of the primary de¯cit deft and the real value of the outstanding debt that the
government owes at the beginning of the period, which in turn is simply the real value this period
12See Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Stock and Watson (2006) for evidence that a random walk model is a
good approximation to in°ation in the U.S. since WWII.
16of outstanding promises to deliver future dollars st¡1
t¡1+j and goods ¹ st¡1
t¡1+j that the government
issued last period.






























































































t¡1;t ¡ gt¡1;t (12)
vt
vt¡1
= 1 + ¼t¡1;t (13)
Here B
j
t¡1 and ¹ B
j
t¡1 de¯ned in (7) and (8) are the real values of nominal and indexed zero-coupon
bonds (strips) of maturity j at t ¡ 1; Bt¡1 and ¹ Bt¡1 de¯ned in (9) and (10) are the total real
values of nominal and indexed debt at t ¡ 1; ~ r
j
t¡1;t de¯ned in (11) is the net nominal holding
period yield between t ¡ 1 and t on nominal strips of maturity j; ¹ r
j
t¡1;t de¯ned in (12) is the net
real holding period yield between t ¡ 1 and t on in°ation indexed strips of maturity j, and ¼t¡1;t
is the in°ation rate between t ¡ 1 and t.
A.3 Data
The price and quantity data for nominal bonds are in the CRSP Monthly Government Bond File.13
The quantity outstanding of the Treasury in°ation-protected securities (TIPS) are in December
13In the CRSP data set the quantity of publicly held marketable debt only goes back to 1960. We extended this
series using data from the Treasury Bulletin.
17issues of the U.S Treasury's Monthly Statement of the Public Debt. For the pre-1970 period, we ¯t
a zero-coupon forward curve from the coupon bond price data via Daniel Waggoner's (1997) cubic
spline method. Waggoner ¯ts the zero-coupon one-period forward-rate curve with a cubic spline
employing a set of roughness criteria to reduce oscillations in the approximated curve. For 1970
to 2008, we use the nominal and real zero-coupon yield curves computed by Gurkaynak, Sack and
Wright (2006, 2008). The value of currency vt is the inverse of the fourth quarter observation of
the GDP price de°ator.








t+j of equation (5) is the real
market value of the interest bearing debt at the end of period t. It excludes nonmarketable
securities (e.g. savings bonds, special issues to state and local governments), securities held by
other government entities (e.g. the Federal Reserve or the Social Security Trust Fund), or agency
debt (e.g. Tennessee Valley Authority). While the Treasury typically reports the par value of the
debt, Seater (1981), Cox and Hirschhorn (1983), Eisner and Peiper (1984), Cox (1985), and Bohn
(1992) have calculated series on the market value of the Treasury's portfolio. Our debt series most
closely aligns with Seater's (1981) MVPRIV2 series (see his Table 1) and Cox and Hirschhorn's
(1983) series \Market value of privately held treasury debt" (see their Table 6).
Eisner and Pieper (1984), Eisner (1986), and Bohn (1992) computed similar measures of the
government's interest payments. Rather than computing the terms on the left side of (5) directly,
they exploited the inter-temporal budget constraint (1) to compute interest payments ~ rt¡1;tBt¡1
as the change in the market value of debt minus the primary de¯cit. An advantage of that
approach is that there no need to construct the pricing kernels and stripped series; the market
value of the debt can be computed directed from the observed prices and quantities outstanding.
An advantage of our approach is that since we compute the returns on the debt directly our
measure is not sensitive to how the primary de¯cit is measured. Furthermore, our arithmetic
also allows us (a) to account for the di®erent holding period yields on obligations of di®erent
maturities and thereby form the decompositions of interest payments in table 1 and ¯gures 1 and
6, (b) to execute the counterfactual debt management experiments described in appendix C, and
(c) to dissect the di®erence between our estimates of the interest costs and those reported by the
Treasury. We turn to this last task in appendix B.
B Bad accounting: what the government instead reports as in-
terest payments
As documented earlier by Hall and Sargent (1997), our estimates of the interest paid on U.S.
government debt di®er substantially from those reported by the government. In this section,
we attempt to track down the sources of di®erences between our way of accounting for interest
and the government's. Since they give di®erent answers, these two interest payment series must
be asking di®erent questions. Our series answers the question \what interest payments appear
in the law of motion over time of real government indebtedness?"14 What question does the
14The law of motion of real government indebtedness is also known as the government budget constraint.
18government's interest payment series answer? And how can we compute it in terms of the objects
q; ¹ q;s; ¹ s de¯ned in appendix A?
We won't get much of an answer by reading government reports. Issues of the Treasury
Bulletin from 1957 to 1982 contained the following concise description of the government's method
for computing its interest expenses:
The computed annual interest charge represents the amount of interest that would be
paid if the interest-bearing issue outstanding at the end of each month or year should
remain outstanding for a year at the applicable annual rate of interest. The charge
is computed for each issue by applying the appropriate annual interest rate to the
amount of the security outstanding on that date.
We interpret these statements to mean that the government computes interest expenses by adding
next year's coupon payments to the product of the outstanding principal due next year and the
one-period holding period yield on one-period pure discount bonds. In this appendix, we shall
verify this interpretation by executing this computation with the q; ¹ q;s; ¹ s series from appendix A
and show that it produces a time series that closely approximates the government's reported series
on interest payments. Then we'll try to reverse engineer a question that this series is designed
to answer. Finally, we'll describe in detail how the government's concept of interest costs fails
to match the concept required by the government's budget constraint (1) or (2) because it treats
coupon payments and capital gains improperly.
To cast the government's computations in terms of our notation, it is useful to de¯ne the
decomposition st¡1
t = st¡1
t (tb) + st¡1
t (p) + st¡1
t (c) where st¡1
t (tb) represents the par value of one-
period pure discount treasury bills and notes, st¡1
t (p) denotes the contribution to st¡1
t coming
from principal due on longer term bonds that mature at t, and st¡1
t (c) represents coupon payments
on longer term bonds accruing at time t.
Then we believe that the government reports the following object as its nominal interest

















































t (c) in the ¯rst expression is the real value of the coupon payments on nominal
bonds, while ¹ st¡1




















t (tb) + st¡1
t (p)
´
, promised at t ¡ 1 to be paid at t multiplied by the one-period holding






on one-period pure discount bills. The two terms in the second
pair of braces are the indexed debt counterparts to the preceding two terms.
In ¯gure 10 we plot the government's o±cial interest payments series and our concept (15).
We divide both series by the market value of debt. The two series track each other quite closely;
the correlation coe±cient for the two series is 0.97.























Figure 10: Our Reverse Engineered Estimates of the Government's Reported Interest Payments
The dashed-red line in the o±cially reported interest costs divided by the market value of debt. The solid blue line
is equation (14) divided by the market value of debt.
In Figure 11 we contrast the Federal Government o±cial interest payment series with our
interest payment series using annual end of the year data from 1941 to 2008. 15 In this graph,
we report both our measure of interest paid (the solid blue line) and the government's reported
interest payments (dashed green line) as percentages of the market value of debt. As can be seen
in this ¯gure, our series is lower on average and considerably more volatile than the government's.
As we report in table 3 the o±cial interest payments average 5.79 percent of the debt while our
measure of the real return on the debt averages 1.69. We then subtract the in°ation rate from
o±cially reported interest payments (dashed red line). The two series have roughly the same
mean (2.02 versus 1.69). Up until the 1980s it appears that much of the di®erence between the
reported series and our series is due to in°ation. Post-1980 something else is going on, namely,
nominal interest rate risk that, in a lower and less volatile in°ation environment, translated into
real interest rate risk.
15The Federal Government reports its interest payments in two places: the annual budget issued by the Treasury
and the NIPA. We use ¯scal data from the NIPA Table 3.2 rather than budget data from the Treasury for two
reasons. First, the Treasury's reports data for the ¯scal year, which runs from October to September while we
measure the cost of funds on a calendar year basis. Second, NIPA interest payments (NIPA table 3.2, line 28)
exclude interest paid to other government trust funds, such as the Social Security trust fund. Interest on the public
debt reported by the Treasury includes interest paid to these trust funds. NIPA interest payments do include
interest paid to the Military and Civil Service retirement funds, because the NIPA shows the assets for these funds
in the household sector. We net out these payments using data on NIPA table 3.18B, line 24.





















Figure 11: A Comparison of the O±cial Interest Payments and Our Estimates of Interest Pay-
ments
The dot-dashed-blue line is our computed value weighted return of the debt. The dashed-red line is the o±cially
reported interest payments divided by the market value of debt. The solid-black line is the dashed-red line minus
the in°ation rate.
Variable Mean Std Dev
O±cial Interest/Debt 5.79 2.66
In°ation 3.77 2.67
O±cial Interest/Debt - in°ation 2.02 3.32
Real Return on Nominal Debt 1.69 4.87
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of Percent Returns: 1942-2008
21B.1 What question is being answered?
To what question is the object computed in (15) the answer? Frankly, this has us stumped. Object
(15) mixes apples and oranges { imputed interest and principal repayments { in peculiar ways. The
spirit of the calculation seems to be, \let's calculate the total funds the government must devote at
time t to servicing its debt," where the devil resides in the details of what one means by servicing.
An interesting question, might be \given the structure of debt in place at t¡1, how many dollars
of principal plus coupons fall due at t?" But that is not what the government computes either.




















t + ¹ st¡1
t .
The government seems to want to exclude repayments of principal and to record only enough
interest payments to roll over its outstanding principal. Thus, the quantity vtst¡1
t (c) + ¹ st¡1
t (c)
measures the quantity of real resources that the government has to come up with to make coupon













in repayments of principal at time t. Apparently,
the government multiplies these principal payments by the appropriate one-period holding period
yields for one-period zero-coupon bonds ~ r1
t;t¡1; ¹ r1
t¡1;t, sums the outcomes, and counts that sum as
a contribution to its total interest payments.
B.2 Pinpointing the government's accounting error





t¡1;t for holding periods j exceeding one. Rewriting the government's concept of
interest payments (15) as
n
vtst¡1




















can help isolate the source of the government's error in computing its interest costs. This ex-
pression reveals the following misconceptions in the government's way of estimating its interest
payments:
1. The ¯rst term in braces is total coupon payments. But coupon payments should not be
viewed as pure interest payments: they are part principal repayments, part interest pay-
ments.
2. The second term in braces correctly measures what is properly a part of government interest
payments according to our budget-constraint-driven de¯nition (1) or (2), namely, the capital
gains or losses that the government pays on its one-period zero coupon bonds; but :::
3. Expression (16) evidently contains no accounting for the capital gains or losses that the
government pays on its zero coupon bonds of maturities longer than one-period. One-




t¡1;t and promised coupon payments for maturities j
exceeding 1 do not appear in (15).
22C Counterfactual debt management
As a way to bring out quantitatively the possibilities that interest rate risk has presented debt
management authorities, we perform some arti¯cial counterfactual experiments that study what
the time path of B=Y would have been under alternative settings for fst
t+jg, on the assumption
of unchanged fvt;qt
t+jg.16
We consider alternative debt-management policies in which the government issues only nom-














t+j = 1: (18)
Evidently ft
t+j is the fraction of the outstanding debt at time t that is due at time t+j. Restrictions





t+j¡1 ´ Vt be the value of interest bearing government debt at the begin-
ning of period t. Given a policy ft
t+j;j = 1;:::n, together with observed interest rates, equation











This equation can be solved recursively to build up paths for st
t+j and decompositions of interest
cost under alternative hypothetical debt management rules. For time invariant policies, let
ft
t+j = fj 8 t:
We consider four policies:
1. Bills only: Set ft
t+1 = f1 = 1 and ft
t+j = fj = 0 for all j 6= 1
2. Tens only: Set ft
t+10 = f10 = 1 and ft
t+j = fj = 0 for all j 6= 10.






where ½i;j is the correlation coe±cient between the holding period returns of i and j period
zero-coupon bonds, and ¾i is the standard deviation of the holding period return for an i
period zero-coupon bond.
16Aizenman and Marion (2009) run a series of counterfactual experiments holding the maturity structure of the
debt ¯xed at it historical values and varying the in°ation rate. In contrast, we hold the in°ation rate at its historical
rates and vary the maturity structure.















each period. We assume the government knows vt+1 and qt+1
t+j prior to choosing st
t+j.
For the ¯rst two policies, the entire debt is purchased and resold each period make sure
all the debt is held in either one-year bills or ten-year zero-coupon bonds (depending on the
experiment). For the third and fourth policies, we assume the government can see into the
future. Under the third policy, we assume the government knows the variances and covariances
of the holding period returns of the di®erent maturities over the sample period (1942-2008) when
it computes the weights of the minimum variance portfolio. For our sample period, the time-
invariant portfolio shares that minimize the variance of the holding period returns are: f1 = 1:26,
f5 = ¡0:35, f10 = 0:09. Under the clairvoyance policy, we not only assume that the Treasury
can fully anticipate movements in the term structure one year in advance but can also act on
this foresight by freely shifting the government policy to minimize its interest costs. While it is
unrealistic to expect that the Treasury could ever implement either of these last two polices, they
provide `best-case' or `upper bound' benchmarks, to compare to the alternative policies.
For all four experiments, we start with the market value of debt at the end of 1941. In
¯gures 12, 14, 16, and 18, we plot the holding period returns for each of these counterfactual
portfolios. In ¯gures 13, 15, 17, and 19, we plot the time path of the debt-to-GDP ratio for each
portfolios. In table 4 we report for each portfolio the mean and standard deviation of the holding
period returns and the terminal debt-to-GDP ratio.
Prior to the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in 1951 the path of returns is close to invariant
to the choice of portfolio. Examination of ¯gures 12, 14, 13, and 15 indicates that debt manage-
ment policies weighted toward longer maturities would have led to lower interest costs and less
accumulation of debt over the period from the Accord until the early 1980s. After the early 1980s,
debt-management policies weighted toward shorter maturities would have generally lowered in-
terest costs and led to less accumulation of debt. From ¯gure 4 it is clear that the Treasury and
Federal Reserve steadily reduced the average maturity of outstanding debt from the 1940s until
the early 1970s; they then increased the average maturity during the late 1970s and throughout
the 1980s. Our analysis indicates that to have minimized its borrowing costs, the government
should have engaged in the opposite strategy.
Over the entire sample, a portfolio of shorter maturity debt would have generated lower
borrowing costs, a reduction in the variance of the returns, and a lower 2008 debt-to-GDP ratio
than a portfolio of longer maturity debt. Consistent with the plot of the nominal payouts reported
in ¯gure 1, we see in ¯gures 12 and 14 that the high volatility of returns in the post-1980 period
was largely concentrated in the longer-term securities. The weights for the minimum variance
portfolio suggest that the bills-only policy is close the minimum variance portfolio. This suggestion
is veri¯ed in ¯gures 12 and 16.17
17Given the ability of nominal debt to act as a hedge to ¯scal shocks, it may not be optimal for the government


















Figure 12: Counterfactual: Ones Only, Returns
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual
Policy Mean Std Dev Dec 2008
Return Return Debt-to-GDP
Actual 1.69 4.87 37.8
Ones Only 1.18 3.27 27.3
Tens Only 2.70 11.43 68.5
Minimum Variance 0.98 3.13 24.4
Clairvoyance -5.90 10.76 8.9
Table 4: Counterfactual Debt Management Policies
Under the clairvoyance policy we see that even if the Treasury could have minimized its interest
costs, returns would have been considerably more volatile than we observed and we would still
have a positive debt-to-GDP ratio. The illustrates the limits of debt management to o®set de¯cit
spending. Even with the 20/20 hindsight, it would not have been possible to shift all the burden
of de¯cit spending onto bondholders.
to minimize the volatility of returns.






















Figure 13: Counterfactual: Ones Only, Debt-to-GDP
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual




















Figure 14: Counterfactual: Tens Only, Returns
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual























Figure 15: Counterfactual: Tens Only, Debt-to-GDP
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual


















Figure 16: Counterfactual: Minimum Variance, Returns
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual






















Figure 17: Counterfactual: Minimum Variance, Debt-to-GDP
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual




















Figure 18: Counterfactual: Clairvoyance, Returns
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual

























Figure 19: Counterfactual: Clairvoyance, Debt-to-GDP
Red-dashed line = Historical; Blue-solid line = Counterfactual
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